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ABSTRACT 
The power of DNA to engage in individualization with unrivaled levels of 
certainty has generated tension in the postconviction arena. This is because DNA 
technology undermines finality interests and the ability of rational procedures to 
produce legitimate (i.e., factually accurate) outcomes, which are fundamental 
ideals of the legal process vision. This Article explores the implications of judicial 
fidelity to the legal process vision when petitioners request access to DNA 
evidence and testing to, inter alia, support an application for clemency. At present, 
the lower courts routinely reject such claims and demonstrate a largely unreserved 
loyalty to the legal process vision. They do this in two ways: (1) routinely applying 
the pro-finality precedent set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in District Attorney’s 
Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), where the 
majority of justices rejected the existence of a freestanding postconviction right to 
DNA access and testing on the basis it would undermine “traditional notions of 
finality”; and (2) underpinning their decisions by deferring to the principle of 
institutional settlement. This pattern in judicial decisionmaking is problematic for 
three key reasons. First, it significantly undermines both the corrective justice 
function of clemency, as set out by the Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390 (1993), and the value of substantive accuracy in the Era of Innocence. 
Second, it demonstrates an awkward approach to credible scientific evidence of 
individualization (i.e., DNA) in light of courts’ more liberal approach to the less 
scientifically supported individualization evidence provided by the soft sciences. 
Third, it ignores the institutional competence of the courts to respond to scientific 
progress and engender an approach to access to DNA testing (which can 
subsequently be used to support a meaningful clemency application) that is 
sensitive to the legal process vision. This Article concludes that courts should take 
a more proactive approach to harnessing the power of DNA. Courts must rethink 
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their reliance on classic tenets of legal process theory to routinely reject the types 
of claims examined in this Article and ease the theory into the 21st Century, where 
it is known—for certain—that rational, pro-finality procedures can produce 
factually erroneous results. 
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DNA technology has revolutionized the American criminal justice 
system since it was first developed by scientists in the 1980s.1 The ability of 
DNA technology to prove both innocence and guilt with consistency and a 
high degree of scientific certainty has “shattered [a] perception of virtual 
infallibility” and exposed the reality that factual error in the criminal justice 
system is, as Findley puts it, “systemic, not just freakishly rare or merely 
episodic.”2 To date, 337 people have been exonerated by postconviction 
DNA testing in America.3 
DNA technology has not settled into the postconviction stage of the 
criminal justice system with ease, however. This is because the ability of 
DNA technology to seriously challenge criminal convictions undermines 
ideals to which postconviction institutions are very loyal.4 These ideals 
include key tenets of the legal process vision, namely, legitimacy of legal 
outcomes badged with procedural regularity, and the various interests that 
make up the doctrine of finality; all of which are allegedly furthered by 
restrictions on postconviction review.5 Therein lies the inevitable tension: 
cases where petitioners possess DNA evidence that proves their factual 
innocence undoubtedly warrant review. Procedural regularity and finality 
must—eventually—be side-lined. 
Before seeking review, however, petitioners first need to access and 
test the DNA evidence in their case.6 But, in the 2009 case of District 
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, the United States 
Supreme Court, by a 5–4 majority, rejected the argument that, as part of the 
right to due process, there is a constitutional right to access and test DNA 
 
 1.  Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921–
22 (2010). 
 2.  Keith A. Findley, Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal 
Justice, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 4 (Sarah Lucy Cooper 
ed., 2014). 
 3.  The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno 
cenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=O&c4= 
Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). 
 4.  See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1630–
31 (2008) [hereinafter Garrett, Claiming Innocence]; Kristen McIntyre, A Prisoner’s 
Right to Access DNA Evidence to Prove His Innocence: Post-Osborne Options, 17 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 565, 567 (2011). 
 5.  See Garrett, Claiming Innocence, supra note 4; McIntyre, supra note 4. 
 6.  See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, DNA Evidence as Newly Discovered 
Evidence Which Will Warrant Grant of New Trial or Other Postconviction Relief in 
Criminal Case, 125 A.L.R. 5th 497, § 2 (2005). 
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evidence postconviction.7 Due process is only triggered when a state 
arbitrarily denies a petitioner access to state DNA testing mechanisms.8 As 
part of its analysis, the Court rejected Osborne’s argument that a due process 
right to DNA testing derived from the liberty interest he had in clemency as 
the DNA evidence would support a future clemency application.9 This 
argument was “readily disposed of”10 with the Court bluntly applying 
precedent that “noncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in 
traditional state executive clemency, to which no particular claimant 
is entitled as a matter of state law.”11 As such, Osborne could not challenge 
the constitutionality of any procedures available to vindicate an interest in 
state clemency.12 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that DNA technology could 
“provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known before” and 
accepted that it had exposed the propensity of the criminal justice system to 
generate factual error.13 By implication, the Court accepted that these 
capabilities make DNA very relevant to postconviction mechanisms such as 
clemency.14 Despite this, the majority was restrained by the “dilemma” DNA 
presented to the “established system of criminal justice.”15 To that end, the 
majority decision was underpinned by concerns that the creation of a 
constitutional right to access DNA for testing would too severely undermine 
 
 7.  See generally Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 
U.S. 52, 72–75 (2009). 
 8.  Id. at 69–70, 72.  
 9.  Id. at 67–68. For a more detailed discussion and definition of “clemency,” see 
Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and Innocence in 
America, 51 CAL W. L. REV. 55, 55–56 (2014) (“Justified under a mixture of retributive, 
redemptive, and utilitarian principles, ‘clemency’ covers ‘a variety of mechanisms an 
executive can use to remit the consequences of a crime,’ including pardons, 
commutations of sentence, reprieves, and the remission of fines and forfeitures. Through 
these mechanisms, executives and/or administrative bodies can accomplish such diverse 
goals as restore civil rights, acknowledge mitigating circumstances, correct egregious 
sentences, prevent deportations, and support political agendas. They can also correct the 
wrongful conviction of innocents.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 10.  Id. at 67. 
 11.  Id. at 67–68 (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 
(1981)). 
 12.  Id. at 68. 
 13.  Id. at 62. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  Id. 
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“traditional notions” of finality and process.16 
Despite Osborne, petitioners continue to seek postconviction access to 
DNA testing through the courts and continue to argue that such testing is 
relevant to seeking clemency.17 This is unsurprising. In Herrera v. Collins,18 
the Supreme Court stated clemency is the fail-safe19 of the criminal justice 
system and the traditional remedy for miscarriages of justice.20 Clemency, 
therefore, has a crucial corrective justice function,21 with Austin Sarat 
labeling it the “court of last resort” for innocents.22 Still, appellate courts 
actively apply Osborne, and its progeny to reject such claims, remaining loyal 
to notions of finality and procedural regularity.23 
This Article explores the implications of judicial fidelity to the legal 
process vision when petitioners request access to DNA evidence and testing 
in order to, inter alia, support an application for clemency. Part I briefly sets 
out the development and capability of DNA technology from the 1980s to 
the present day. Part II further explores the influence of finality and the 
desire for procedural regularity on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Osborne,24 Skinner v. Switzer,25 Herrera,26 and Ohio Adult Parole Authority 
v. Woodard.27 Part III confirms the influence of the Osborne decision on 
lower courts by presenting a cohort of cases where petitioners have argued 
for access to DNA evidence and testing in order to, inter alia, further a 
clemency application. Applying Osborne, the lower courts routinely reject 
such claims and demonstrate a largely unreserved loyalty to ideals of finality 
and procedural regularity. Part IV argues that this pattern in judicial 
decisionmaking is problematic, particularly in light of the corrective justice 
function afforded to clemency in Herrera. This current judicial trend 
 
 16.  Id. at 72–73. 
 17.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 18.  See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 19.  Id. at 415. 
 20.  Id. at 411–12. 
 21.  Cooper & Gough, supra note 9, at 81 (citing Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing 
the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 572 (2001)). 
 22.  Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the 
Killing State, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 183, 185 (2008). 
 23.  See infra Part III. 
 24.  See generally Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 
U.S. 52 (2009). 
 25.  See generally Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011). 
 26.  See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 27.  See generally Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). 
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significantly undermines both clemency’s corrective justice function and the 
value of substantive accuracy in the Era of Innocence. Moreover it 
demonstrates an awkward approach toward credible scientific evidence and 
ignores courts’ own institutional competence for addressing scientific 
change. Part V concludes that the courts must rethink their routine reliance 
on legal process theory to reject these claims. The courts must assist 
clemency to fulfill its corrective justice function by ensuring petitioners have 
the tools necessary to present meaningful clemency applications. These tools 
should include access to, and testing of, DNA evidence. The lower courts 
must no longer apply Osborne as a default position but should instead 
recognize their own institutional competence to respond to the demands of 
the criminal justice system in the Era of Innocence and loosen the system’s 
grip on regular process and finality when cases of factual error can be proven 
by the application of credible scientific testing. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND CAPABILITY OF DNA TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
DNA is the molecular structure in all living organisms that contains 
genetic information.28 An organism’s complete DNA profile is called a 
genome.29 Human cells that have a nucleus, such as skin cells, sperm cells, 
and saliva cells, contain a copy of a person’s genome.30 “Two unrelated 
human genomes share over 99.9 [percent] of genetic data; however, 
variations in the remaining portion . . . produce a genetic fingerprint unique 
to each individual, with the exception of identical twins.”31 DNA is very 
 
 28.  Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science Challenges for Trial 
Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the “Polybutadiene” Meets the “Bitumen,” 18 WIDENER 
L.J. 309, 320 (2009) (“DNA is the molecular structure in all living things that contains 
genetic information. DNA evidence is very durable and can be extracted from the 
smallest of remains many years after a crime. Equally significant is its ‘polymorphism,’ 
meaning that, depending on the method used for its extraction, it is unique among 
humans and can identify the donor of the specimen with overwhelming accuracy. DNA 
testing can be extremely precise and can often demonstrate that only one person in 
billions could have been the source of the specimen evidence.” (citations omitted)). 
 29.  Genome, WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 797 (Random House 2d ed. 
2001) (defining genome as a full set of chromosomes). 
 30.  See DNA Analysis, THE FORENSICS LIBRARY, http://aboutforensics.co.uk/dna-
analysis/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
 31.  Michael P. Luongo, Note, Post-Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA 
Evidence: Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), 29 TEMP. J. SCI. 
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 129 (2010); see also RON C. MICHAELIS, ROBERT G. FLANDERS 
JR. & PAULA H. WULFF, A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO DNA: FROM THE LABORATORY TO 
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durable and can be extracted from the smallest of remains many years after 
a crime.32 
“DNA profiling was originally developed as a method of determining 
paternity [in the 1980s],” but its potential use in the criminal justice system 
was “quickly realized.”33 Because perpetrators of crimes leave behind traces 
of themselves—such as skin, blood, hairs, saliva, or semen—at crime scenes 
and on victims, investigators realized DNA could be harnessed to “catch” 
the guilty and vindicate the innocent.34  
Over the last 30 years, three methods of DNA profiling have emerged 
and been applied in furtherance of criminal investigation.35 The first—
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)—was developed in 
1985 and “became the dominant form of DNA profiling throughout the early 
1990s.”36 “The RFLP test produced a high degree of certainty of a positive 
match, and could conclusively exclude a person as the source of a sample if 
there was no match.”37 Still, the method was limited largely because “it 
required . . . large amount[s] of genetic material to obtain clear results” and 
was “not suitable for use on the degraded DNA samples often found in crime 
scenes.”38 
The second method of DNA profiling, Short Tandem Repeat (STR), 
was propelled from the development of a technique called Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) in the late 1980s.39 This technique copies short strands of 
 
THE COURTROOM 11 (2008). 
 32.  See HOWARD COLEMAN & ERIC SWENSON, DNA IN THE COURTROOM: A 
TRIAL WATCHER’S GUIDE 25–27 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relative Priority 
Which Should Be Assigned to Trial Stage DNA Issues, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 91, 92 (David Laze ed., 2004); Shelton, 
supra note 28. 
 33.  Luongo, supra note 31, at 131. 
 34.  See id. The notion that criminals leave behind traces of themselves at crime 
scenes and on victims can be traced back to the origins of forensic science, long before 
the development of DNA profiling. Edmond Locard, who opened the world’s first 
criminal investigation laboratory in 1910, developed the Locard Exchange Principle, 
which simply states, “Every contact leaves a trace.” VAL MCDERMID, FORENSICS: THE 
ANATOMY OF CRIME 5 (2014) (“[Locard] wrote: ‘It is impossible for a criminal to act, 
especially considering the intensity of a crime, without leaving traces of his presence.’”). 
 35.  See Luongo, supra note 31, at 30–31. 
 36.  Id. at 130 (citations omitted).  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 39.  Id. at 130–31. 
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DNA from a small number of initial strands.40 As such, PCR-based DNA 
profiling can produce results from smaller or degraded samples of DNA, 
e.g., those more likely to be found at crime scenes.41 STR-generated DNA 
profiles “are both highly sensitive and highly discriminating.”42 
A third method of DNA profiling—mitochondrial DNA typing—
emerged in the mid-1990s.43 This method utilizes DNA drawn “from the 
mitochondria of the cell rather than the nucleus.”44 “Mitochondria are small 
intracellular bodies, or organelles, located outside of the nucleus that contain 
their own small DNA genomes.”45 As “[m]itochondrial DNA typing can be 
applied to biological material such as hair shafts or bones that do not have a 
nucleus,” it has the ability—unlike RFLP and STR-testing methods—to 
yield results from samples not containing nuclear DNA.46 This method of 
profiling “lacks the precision to conclusively match a person to a sample,” 
but is “valuable because a non-match can conclusively exclude a person as 
the source of a test sample, and for certain biological materials, it is the only 
test that can be performed.”47 
Over the last three decades, developments in DNA technology have 
increased both the specificity and sensitivity of testing techniques.48 DNA 
analysts can now obtain a profile from cellular material left at crime scenes 
that is invisible to the naked eye and still establish the probability of finding 
the particular combination of DNA in another randomly selected person as 
less than one in several billion.49 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See A Brief History of DNA Testing, NEW ENGLAND INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.newenglandinnocence.org/knowledge-center/resources/dna/ (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2015). 
 44.  Luongo, supra note 31, at 131 (citations omitted). 
 45.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 48.  See id. at 130–31. 
 49.  See Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, FBI Resists Scrutiny of ‘Matches,’ L.A. TIMES 
(July 20, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/20/local/me-dna20 (“The FBI 
estimated the odds of unrelated people sharing those genetic markers to be as remote as 
1 in 113 billion.”); see also MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 31, at 105–06 (estimating the 
average random match probability for a positive match of an individual to a sample 
associated with a criminal investigation using the FBI’s CODIS system is 1 in 1 trillion). 
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DNA profiling is not infallible, of course. Infallibility is a myth, and 
would remove the “science” of DNA from its social context.50 DNA profiling 
involves social actors and therefore is subject to human error.51 False positive 
results, mistakes, contamination, and falsification (among other things) are 
always a possibility.52 Still, the proven capabilities of DNA profiling (absent 
error) have led to it being labeled the gold-standard of forensic techniques.53 
Unlike other popular forensic techniques such as friction-ridge analysis and 
tool-mark analysis, exhaustive testing has led to the progressive 
development of DNA profiling such that the technique has a quantifiable 
and miniscule error rate.54 Thus, the discovery and development of DNA 
profiling have raised the bar as to what is scientifically acceptable for 
identifying a source “to the exclusion of all others.”55 The National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS)—one of the world’s premier sources of independent, 
expert advice on scientific issues—acknowledged this in 2009.56 In its 
landmark report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (the NAS Report), the NAS concluded: “With the exception of 
nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has been rigorously shown to 
have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, 
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or 
source.”57 
 
 50.  See Shelton, supra note 28, at 323–34 (“Although DNA profiling is clearly 
scientifically superior to other forensic identification evidence, it is not—contrary to 
earlier pronouncements—infallible. DNA evidence and its underlying methodology are, 
of course, subject to human error. False positive DNA results have occurred and will 
undoubtedly continue to be part of the DNA testing landscape. Proffered evidence may 
still, as with other forensic science evidence, be the result of mistakes or contamination 
in its collection, testing, or interpretation. As the technology and methodology of DNA 
testing has progressed, it is the human errors that may present the biggest evidentiary 
challenges for trial judges.” (citations omitted)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court 
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 235 (2013) 
(quoting Mickael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Encounters with 
Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1082, 1119 (1998)). 
 56.  See NAS REPORT, supra note 53. 
 57.  Id. 
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The power of DNA led to a criminal justice revolution in the form of 
the American Innocent Movement; a Movement considered to be as 
significant as Chief Justice Warren’s “Due Process Revolution” of the 
1960s.58 As Brandon Garrett explains: 
Traditional postconviction law emphasized leaving final convictions 
undisturbed because, over time, courts could not reliably revisit facts, as 
witnesses’ memories faded and physical evidence degraded. DNA 
testing made it possible to reopen cold cases decades after a trial and 
obtain remarkably accurate scientific evidence concerning identity. As 
DNA technology steadily improved during the 1990s, law enforcement 
created vast DNA databanks, tens of thousands of crimes were solved 
using DNA testing, and many thousands of suspects were excluded 
using DNA testing. As innocence projects secured the release of 
mounting numbers of innocent prisoners, legislators recognized the 
importance of DNA testing postconviction, and almost all states 
enacted statutes providing access to DNA and postconviction relief.59 
These changes saw “innocence consciousness” replace perceptions that 
the criminal justice system was virtually infallible.60 Now, with over 330 
postconviction DNA testing exonerations secured across America;61 studies 
revealing jurors have an increased thirst for scientific evidence;62 innocence 
commissions researching the wrongful convictions DNA has exposed;63 
 
 58.  Findley, supra note 2, at 3. 
 59.  Garrett, DNA and Due Process, supra note 1, at 2921–22 (citations omitted). 
 60.  See Keith Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1172–77 (2011). 
 61.  The Cases, supra note 3. 
 62.  See, e.g., Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror 
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 
9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 333 (2006). 
 63.  See generally Sarah Lucy Cooper, Innocence Commissions in America: Ten 
Years After, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 197–207 (Sarah Lucy 
Cooper ed., 2014) [hereinafter Cooper, Innocence Commissions]. Notably, in October, 
2015 Iowa Governor, Terry Branstad, announced the creation of a Wrongful Conviction 
Division at the Office of the State Public Defender in Des Moines, Iowa. Office of the 
Gov. of Iowa, Governor Branstad Announces Creation of the Wrongful Conviction 
Division, IOWA.GOV (Oct. 26, 2015), https://governor.iowa.gov/2015/10/governor-
branstad-announces-creation-of-the-wrongful-conviction-division. The Division will 
“systematically review and identify potential cases involving wrongful convictions and 
pursue available legal remedies.” Id. The creation of the division is seemingly propelled 
by a desire to strengthen confidence in the Iowa criminal justice system, by providing an 
integrated self-correction mechanism. Given the integration of the division into Public 
Defender’s Office, the Author would now categorize the division as a “back-end” 
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error-correction commissions investigating and litigating cases with 
exculpatory DNA;64 and clemency being granted to petitioners in possession 
of exculpatory DNA test results,65 the impact of DNA technology is 
unquestionable. 
The Supreme Court, however, has been more cautious, preferring to 
remain loyal to procedural regularity and finality rather than embrace the 
accuracy that DNA testing has the potential to produce. The Supreme 
Court’s conservative approach towards DNA testing, clemency, and due 
process is outlined in Part II. 
II. LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AND ITS INFLUENCE IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCESS TO DNA TESTING AND CLEMENCY 
The Supreme Court has “lingered on the sidelines” as the DNA 
revolution has churned the American criminal justice system.66 The Court’s 
position has been underpinned by its loyalty to the legal process vision. This 
approach is evident in four key cases in the context of clemency and DNA 
evidence: Herrera, Woodard, Osborne, and Skinner. This Part briefly sets out 
the legal process vision before moving on to outline its influence on the 
Supreme Court in these cases. 
A. The Legal Process Vision: Promoting Finality and Procedural 
Regularity Postconviction 
Legal Process Theory was conceived by Professor Henry M. Hart Jr. 
and Professor M. Albert Sacks in the 1960s.67 At the center of that vision is 
the principle of institutional settlement, which expresses the view that when 
decisions are made by an institution that has been granted competence to 
make relevant decisions (such as a trial court), and that decision is “duly 
arrived at as a result of duly established procedures,”68 it “ought to be 
 
integrity program. See Cooper, supra, at 199–200, for examples of front-end integrity 
programs. 
 64.  See generally id. 
 65.  See, e.g., The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, Clark McMillan, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/clark-mcmillan?s 
earchterm=clark+mcm (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
 66.  See Garrett, DNA and Due Process, supra note 1, at 2922. 
 67.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994). 
 68.  Id. 
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accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they [(the 
procedures)] are duly changed.”69 In other words, the principle theorizes that 
it is procedural regularity in the decisionmaking process of a competent 
institution that legitimizes the institution’s decisions, not whether its 
decisions are substantively accurate.70 Procedure is “critically important”71 
because it provides an effective way of obtaining “good” decisions, facilitates 
the collaboration of institutions in an interconnected institutional system 
(like the criminal justice system), and enhances the legitimacy of the law by 
generating consistency.72 
The legal process vision is acutely linked to finality. The doctrine of 
finality developed out of a taxonomy detailed by Professor Paul M. Bator in 
1963.73 Bator argued that the finality of criminal judgments serves important 
interests that are harmed by expansions of postconviction rights74 and 
proposed “that because we can never know [with] 100 [percent] certainty 
that no error of law or fact was made during trial or appellate proceedings, 
we must impose an end to litigation at some point or else the case could 
conceivably go on ad infinitum.”75 Fifty years later, it is widely accepted that 
finality interests include: 
ensuring respect for criminal judgments, conserving state resources, 
furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational functions of the 
criminal law, satisfying the human need for closure, incentivizing 
defense counsel to “get it right first time” and preventing a flood of non-
controversial claims from masking the fewer, credible ones.76  
The legal process is the focal point of Bator’s taxonomy.77 According 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: 
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 721 (1991). 
 72.  Id. at 721–22. 
 73.  Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 446–53 (1963). 
 74.  See id.; Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of 
Criminal Judgments in the DNA Era, 1 L.J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76–77 (2011). 
 75.  See Popko, supra note 74, at 76 (citing Bator, supra note 73, at 446–53). 
 76.  Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to Firearms-Identification 
Evidence: A Need for New Judicial Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
457, 459–60 (2014) [hereinafter Cooper, Firearms-Identification] (citations omitted). 
 77.  So much so it has been referred to as “Bator’s Process View.” See, e.g., Gabriel 
A. Carrera, Note, Section 1983 & the Age of Innocence: The Supreme Court Carves a 
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to Bator, the efficacy of outcomes produced by the criminal justice system 
(such as jury verdicts and trial court decisions) require the application of a 
procedural model that provides “a reasoned and acceptable probability that 
justice will be done.”78 When faced with postconviction challenges, legal-
process thinkers ask if the measures and processes of the trial court gave the 
petitioners a full and fair opportunity to challenge the case against them and 
present their own case.79 If so, the legal process vision dictates that the 
relevant outcomes are legitimate—whether they are substantively accurate 
or not.80 Consequently, the process model simultaneously protects finality 
interests by restricting the means to usurp a rationally processed 
conviction.81 This approach underpins postconviction frameworks across 
America,82 and pervades the rationales of appellate judges considering 
challenges to evidence postconviction and executives with decisionmaking 
powers in clemency procedures.83 
The DNA-inspired criminal justice revolution has disturbed (or at least 
should have disturbed) this process-sensitive status quo. As Starger sets out: 
“[T]he current postconviction DNA access debate concerns how proof 
intersects with legal process. DNA’s extraordinary forensic power to 
determine guilt or innocence has challenged traditional notions of finality 
for criminal convictions where proof was adduced ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”84 
DNA technology has proven that the application of rational 
procedures can lead to factually incorrect outcomes. DNA “can cast 
legitimate doubt on the verdict of the trial, quite apart from any procedural 
defect.”85 DNA technology is a development that the legal process vision 
 
Procedural Loophole for Post-Conviction DNA Testing in Skinner v. Switzer, 61 AM. U. 
L. REV. 431, 440 (2011). 
 78.  Bator, supra note 73, at 448. 
 79.  Carrera, supra note 77. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  See Cooper, Firearms-Identification, supra note 76, at 462–64; Sarah Lucy 
Cooper, Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientific Opinion in Forensic Identification 
Evidence and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims in the United States: The Influence of 
Finality and Legal Process Theory, BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 649, 678–79 (2015) 
[hereinafter Cooper, Shifting Scientific Opinion]. 
 83.  Cooper & Gough, supra note 21, at 87. 
 84.  Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1047 (2009). 
 85.  David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction 
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failed to forecast and has yet to resolve.86 While procedural regularity may 
provide levels of consistency and certainty, “it also raises the possibility that 
the importance people attach to procedural justice may distract them from 
the failure of the legal system to provide substantively fair outcomes.”87 
Petitioners armed (actually or potentially) with exculpatory DNA 
evidence have tried to disturb this status quo. They have filed claims in 
appellate courts for access, testing, and review of DNA evidence and have 
filed clemency applications premised on that actual and prospective access 
and testing.88 How the U.S. Supreme Court has sculpted the common law 
with regards to these avenues, therefore, is crucial. The following sub-
sections consider four key cases decided by the Court in this domain and 
demonstrate how the legal process vision has influenced the Court’s 
decisionmaking. 
B. Herrera v. Collins and Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: The 
Legal Process Vision Collides with Clemency, Innocence, and Due Process 
In Herrera v. Collins,89 the Court held that Herrera’s claim of actual 
innocence (absent some other procedural violation in his case) was not a 
ground for federal habeas relief.90 In so holding, the Court reasoned that (1) 
clemency was the fail-safe of the criminal justice system;91 (2) state clemency 
processes are the proper mechanism for assessing innocence claims;92 and (3) 
clemency has always been the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of 
justice where the judicial process had been exhausted.93 Consequently, “the 
creation of a judicial remedy [bespoke for actual innocence claims] was not 
necessary for the constitutionally convicted yet actually innocent prisoner 
because clemency is the appropriate forum for adjudicating actual innocence 
claims.”94 
 
Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1060 (2010). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1013, 1027 (2008) (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 86 (1988)). 
 88.  See infra Part III. 
 89.  See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 90.  Id. at 400, 404. 
 91.  Id. at 415. 
 92.  Id. at 416. 
 93.  Id. at 411–12. 
 94.  Ryan Dietrich, A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process as a 
Trigger for a Right of Access to State-Held DNA Evidence, 62 MD. L. REV. 1028, 1034 
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Concerns about finality played a significant role in the Court’s decision. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that allowing 
actual innocence to stand solely as a ground for federal habeas relief would 
have a “very disruptive effect . . . on the need for finality”95 and was mindful 
of the “enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale 
evidence would place on the States.”96 As Justice O’Connor stated in a 
concurrence joined by Justice Kennedy, “At some point in time, the State’s 
interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner’s interest in yet another round 
of litigation.”97 The majority opinion further remarked that, if a petitioner 
was to have a freestanding right to make an actual innocence claim, the 
threshold for relief would “necessarily be extraordinarily high.”98 This 
rationale drew upon a fundamental “interest” of finality, namely the 
prevention of frivolous claims flooding the appellate system and masking the 
fewer, credible claims.99 Justice O’Connor concluded, “If the federal courts 
are to entertain claims of actual innocence, their attention, efforts, and 
energy must be reserved for the truly extraordinary case; they ought not be 
forced to sort through the insubstantial and the incredible as well.”100 
In 1998, the Supreme Court considered whether clemency was an 
“integral” part of Ohio’s system for adjudicating guilt or innocence in the 
case of Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard.101 In contradiction of its 
decision in Herrera, the Court determined “clemency proceedings are not 
part of the trial or even of the adjudicatory process. They do not determine 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and are not intended primarily to 
enhance the reliability of the trial process.”102 In so holding, the Court 
affirmed that clemency decisions are not the “business of the courts.”103 
Five justices agreed that minimal due process protections attached to 
clemency proceedings.104 Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Breyer, 
 
(2003) (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412). 
 95.  Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 426 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 98.  Id. at 417. 
 99.  See id.; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 100.  Herrera, 506 U.S. at 426–27 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 101.  Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1997). 
 102.  Compare Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284, with Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411–12. 
 103.  Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284 (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 
458, 464 (1981)). 
 104.  Id. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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Ginsburg, and Souter, concluded that “some minimal procedural safeguards 
apply to clemency proceedings,”105 even if the power to grant clemency is 
solely entrusted to the executive.106 Justice O’Connor reasoned that judicial 
intervention might be “warranted in the face of a scheme whereby the state 
official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency or in a case 
where the state arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency 
process.”107 Justice Stevens separately concurred, arguing it would be wrong 
for clemency processes “infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, 
or the deliberate fabrication of false evidence” to be constitutionally 
acceptable.108 
Concerns about safeguarding finality interests were not obvious in 
Woodard. There was only a fleeting reference when the Court described 
clemency as a mere “unilateral hope,” somewhere a defendant can appeal to 
“as a matter of grace” after he has accepted “the finality of the . . . sentence 
for the purposes of adjudication.”109 However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Woodard to (1) (somewhat reluctantly) attach only minimal due process 
protections to clemency proceedings and set a very high threshold for 
review, i.e., require petitioners to show the extremity of a coin toss or its 
functional equivalent110 in the course of their clemency proceedings in order 
to trigger judicial intervention; and (2) affirm that courts should not interfere 
in state clemency proceedings save extraordinary circumstances,111 have 
conspired to encourage lower courts to routinely reject challenges to alleged 
unconstitutional state clemency proceedings, and thus preserve finality 
interests.112 
 
 105.  Id. at 289. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 290–91. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109.  Id. at 281–82 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). 
 110.  See id. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
This sort of language appears throughout judicial decisions to reject claims that state 
clemency processes violate Woodard’s minimal due process standard. Some courts refer 
to the extremity of a coin toss or “flip of a coin.” See, e.g., Aruanno v. Corzine, No. 07-
5270 (AET), 2007 WL 4591378, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2007). Whereas others employ 
phrases such as the “roll of a dice.” See, e.g., Link v. Nixon, No. 2:11-cv-4040NKL, 2011 
WL 529577, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2011). 
 111.  See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284–85 (noting the process of clemency is not within 
the normal operation of the judiciary). 
 112.  This practice has allowed even the most suspect clemency proceedings to pass 
constitutional muster. See Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving 
Times, 31 CAP. U.L. REV. 219, 235–36 (2003) (“Thus far, virtually every challenge to state 
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Herrera and Woodard have led to the judiciary and clemency having 
an uneasy relationship: “On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has made 
clear its view that our criminal justice system relies on a functioning 
clemency doctrine. On the other hand, the Court notes that clemency 
decisions do not readily lend themselves to judicial supervision or review.”113 
The development of DNA profiling has exacerbated this tension. The 
increasing use of postconviction DNA testing has strengthened a petitioner’s 
ability to present a case of actual innocence to clemency authorities.114 The 
Supreme Court, however, has yet to facilitate this avenue of relief and to 
side-line process-thinking accordingly. This is demonstrated by the Court’s 
decisions in Osborne and Skinner. 
C. District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne and 
Skinner v. Switzer: The Legal Process Vision Collides with DNA, Due 
Process, and Innocence 
In Osborne, the Supreme Court refused to “constitutionalize the issue” 
of access to DNA testing.115 The majority found there was no freestanding 
due process right to DNA testing, fashioning instead “a qualified, 
derivative”116 procedural due process right to DNA testing based on “a 
liberty interest in demonstrating . . . innocence with new evidence under 
state law.”117 However, the fact that Alaska provided an adequate statute for 
obtaining postconviction access to DNA evidence, which Osborne had 
neglected to utilize, meant he could not challenge the process as applied to 
him.118 
Fidelity to the legal process vision drove the Osborne majority’s 
decision. The majority analyzed Osborne’s claim as an issue of institutional 
settlement. As one scholar explained: 
 
clemency procedures based on Woodard has been summarily rejected by lower courts, 
despite allegations of serious irregularities.”). 
 113.  Michael Heise, The Death of Death Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics 
of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV. 949, 965–66 (2015) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 411–12, 415 (1993); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 
(1981)). 
 114.  Id. at 951, 965. 
 115.  Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 56 
(2009). 
 116.  Garrett, supra note 1, at 2921 (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68). 
 117.  Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68. 
 118.  Id. at 69–71. 
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The existence of Alaska procedures to obtain postconviction DNA 
testing formed the opinion’s “starting point in analyzing Osborne’s 
constitutional claims.” After finding “nothing inadequate” about 
Alaska’s procedures, the Court deliberately echoed Wilkinson in 
declining to “short-circuit” state legislative activity. In the end, the 
majority did not find DNA’s accuracy relevant to a debate it sees as 
fundamentally about the morality of federal courts overriding state 
processes.119 
The Osborne majority believed there was a “dilemma [about] how to 
harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily 
overthrowing the established system of criminal justice,”120 which was 
underpinned with “traditional notions of finality.”121 Concerns about 
undermining the legal process vision are reflected in the Court’s desire to 
maintain the trial as the “‘main event’ in which the issue of guilt or innocence 
can be fairly resolved.”122 By couching the issue in these terms “the Court 
implied that DNA’s truth-telling power must somehow be constrained to fit 
into our existing system as opposed to allowing the system to change in 
response to the unique power of DNA evidence.”123 In other words, a 
constitutional right to DNA testing does not fit the legal process vision 
because it undermines the efficacy of the criminal justice system, despite its 
thousands of procedures and measures.124 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
observed the institutional competence of the political branches of state 
governments to work out how the law should address new technological 
developments: “The elected governments of the States are actively 
confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our criminal justice 
systems and our traditional notions of finality, as well as the opportunities it 
affords.”125 The Supreme Court worried that to constitutionalize this area 
suddenly would short-circuit “a prompt and considered legislative 
response,” i.e., shirk the legal process vision.126 
 
 119.  Starger, supra note 84, at 1099–100 (citations omitted). 
 120.  Osborne, 557 U.S at 62. 
 121.  Id. at 72. 
 122.  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 123.  Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense Access to the Law 
Enforcement DNA Database, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 846 (2015) (citing Osborne, 557 
U.S. at 62). 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  Osborne, 557 U.S at 72–73. 
 126.  Id. at 73. 
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The Court confronted the issue again Skinner v Switzer.127 Skinner, a 
death row inmate, sought postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Texas 
law.128 State courts refused his request, so he filed a federal claim alleging 
that Texas violated his right to due process in refusing him access to the 
evidence to perform DNA testing.129 
The Court allowed Skinner’s claim, but remained true to the legal 
process vision. First, the majority explained that the DNA evidence, in 
Skinner’s case, “would not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his 
conviction” because, while it may prove exculpatory, it may just as likely 
prove inconclusive or inculpatory.130 In other words, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to allow access to the DNA evidence did not—of itself—undermine 
the validity of Skinner’s conviction and, thus, the process that it had been 
obtained by.131 Switzer did not, therefore, create a precedent that would be 
at odds with the legal process vision.132 Second, the Supreme Court was 
swayed by the fact that Skinner, unlike Osborne, had not attempted to 
circumvent state procedures and therefore had not chipped away at the 
principle of institutional competence.133 Third, the Court “delineated several 
safeguards” against the argument that its holding would significantly disrupt 
finality interests, especially the interest of not having the federal courts 
 
 127.  Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524 (2011). 
 128.  Id. at 528. 
 129.  Id. at 528–29. 
 130.  Id. at 534. 
 131.  See id. Unsurprisingly, the dissent was concerned about how access would 
disrupt legal process values. See id. at 540–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters found 
that if Skinner’s Section 1983 claim were cognizable at all, it would sound in a habeas 
petition. Id. at 540. They were of the view that, because there is no federal remedy for 
reviewing state trial procedures, which are part of the “process of law under which [a 
prisoner] is held in custody by the State,” Section 1983 should not be extended to review 
post-trial proceedings. Id. (quoting Frank v. Manqum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915) 
(alteration in original)). “Similarly, although a state is not required to provide 
procedures for postconviction review, it seems clear that when state collateral review 
procedures are provided for, they too are part of the ‘process of law under which [a 
prisoner] is held in custody by the State.’” Id. (quoting Manqum, 237 U.S. at 327) 
(alteration in original). In other words, the dissent was concerned with the principle of 
institutional settlement. See Jennifer F. McLaughlin, Comment, Just DNA: Expansion 
of Federal § 1983 Jurisdiction Under Skinner v. Switzer Should be Limited to Actions 
Seeking DNA Evidence, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 201, 217 (2013). 
 132.  See Skinner, 526 U.S. at 534. 
 133.  See id. at 530–31. 
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submerged in a wave of claims seeking access to evidence.134 These 
safeguards included: (1) affirming the Osborne ruling that there is no 
substantive due process right to DNA testing;135 (2) acknowledging that 
there was no evidence showing “any litigation flood or even rainfall” in the 
federal circuit courts of appeal that have allowed claims for postconviction 
access to DNA;136 and (3) relying on the several constraints on federal claims 
contained in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.137 
The legal process vision underpinned the decisions in Herrera, 
Woodard, Osborne, and Switzer, albeit in varying forms. The approach of 
the Supreme Court to favor process over substantive accuracy has heavily 
influenced the lower courts. Part III confirms this by presenting a cohort of 
cases where petitioners have argued for access to DNA evidence and testing 
to, inter alia, further a clemency application pre- and post-Osborne. 
Following Osborne, the lower courts have solidified an approach that 
routinely rejects such claims and demonstrates an unreserved loyalty to 
ideals of finality and procedural regularity. 
III. ACCESS TO DNA EVIDENCE TO, INTER ALIA, SUPPORT A CLEMENCY 
APPLICATION: RECENT APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Prior to the decision in Osborne, a number of courts addressed claims 
on access to evidence for DNA testing and the relation of that evidence to a 
petitioner’s clemency application. 
In the 2001 case of Cherrix v. Braxton,138 a federal district court 
acknowledged the pertinence of DNA evidence to a petitioner wishing to 
pursue an innocence claim via clemency, stating, “Without the DNA testing, 
it would be futile for Cherrix to seek clemency because he has no new 
evidence upon which to make a truly persuasive claim for Clemency.”139 The 
 
 134.  McLaughlin, supra note 131, at 216. 
 135.  Skinner, 526 U.S. at 525. 
 136.  Id. at 535. 
 137.  Id. at 535–36 (citing Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 
(2006)). 
 138.  See generally Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 139.  Id. at 768. (“It is unlikely that a viable petition for clemency is available to 
Cherrix without the persuasive conclusions of the DNA tests. The Governor of Virginia 
is not required to review or accept for submission any clemency petition, even if the 
applicant presents compelling evidence of actual innocence. Moreover, ‘most of the 
Virginia proceedings than culminated in executive clemency began in court with 
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court ordered testing on the basis that, inter alia, clemency had a corrective 
justice function under Herrera; the court, however, remained loyal to the 
legal process vision.140 First, the court reasoned that the testing would assist 
in proving the efficacy of the criminal justice system: “Such a result would 
remove the nagging questions surrounding this case that might otherwise 
undermine confidence in the criminal justice system.”141 Second, the court 
underscored that its decision made no pronouncement on the petitioner’s 
innocence and therefore did not imply the jury’s verdict was wrong.142 Third, 
the court grounded its decision in concerns about procedure (as opposed to 
accuracy), reasoning that the provision of funds for DNA testing and 
preservation of the evidence was appropriate because there were “disturbing 
questions regarding the constitutionality of Cherrix’s trial proceedings.”143 
The loyalty of the courts to process thinking continued in subsequent 
cases, but with more conservative results. In Alley v. Key, for example, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a death row inmate’s request for 
access to DNA evidence on the basis that there was no substantive due 
process right to clemency, and thus the state’s denial of access did not “shock 
the conscience.”144 The court rationalized its judgment via deference to the 
principle of institutional settlement.145 As access could only be granted in 
accordance with state law, it was “neither arbitrary nor capricious for [the 
state] to defend legally what has to date been viewed as valid state practice 
in the handling of extremely belated requests for examination of alleged 
DNA evidence.”146 
In Arthur v. King, the petitioner argued that the denial of access to 
DNA evidence rendered his clemency process arbitrary.147 Given the 
executive-based nature of clemency—and slim protection provided by 
minimal due process—the court rejected his claim.148 Given no testing results 
 
successful requests for access to court exhibits containing critical biological evidence that 
was ultimately subjected to DNA testing.’” (citations omitted)). 
 140.  See id. at 767–69. 
 141.  Id. at 787. 
 142.  Id. at 786. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Alley v. Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364, at *1–2 (6th Cir. May 14, 2006). 
 145.  See id. at *2. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Arthur v. King, No. 2:07-CV-319-WKW, 2007 WL 2381992, at *10 (M.D. Ala. 
Aug. 17, 2007). 
 148.  Id. 
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had been withheld from the governor (because no testing had been 
conducted), the petitioner’s argument—that the state was violating state law 
by not providing the governor with all pertinent information to his clemency 
application—was meritless.149 Again, focusing on the principle of 
institutional settlement, the key point was that the petitioner had been 
provided access to the state’s clemency process.150 The revelations that might 
result from testing of the DNA evidence were irrelevant.151 
There was seemingly a single, yet assertive, shift by one court in favor 
of accuracy in 2008. In McKithen v. Brown, McKithen had been convicted of 
the attempted murder of his wife, and he petitioned the court for access to 
DNA testing on a knife that could exonerate him.152 One question the court 
considered was whether McKithen’s liberty interest—meaningful access to 
existing executive clemency mechanisms—encompassed access to perform 
DNA testing on the knife.153 Judge John Gleeson of the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, referring to Herrera’s labeling of 
clemency as a “fail-safe,” held there was 
strong support for my conclusion that the right of meaningful access to 
existing clemency mechanisms entails the right to certain evidence of 
innocence. Though clemency proceedings are not exclusively or even 
primarily “error-correction” proceedings, and often turn not on a 
revisitation of the facts underlying a conviction, but on an analysis of a 
defendant’s contrition and personality, they nevertheless have one 
significant, even if discretionary, error-correcting function: they are the 
last resort for the wrongfully convicted.154 
In allowing McKithen’s claims, Judge Gleeson tackled the state’s finality 
interest head-on: 
  The government does have an interest in finality, but that interest 
is not substantially burdened by a prisoner performing DNA testing on 
physical evidence used to convict him. . . . States have uniformly found 
the value of clemency mechanisms to outweigh whatever impacts on 
finality they may have. Having set up clemency mechanisms specifically 
 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 626 
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 153.  Id. at 457–58. 
 154.  Id. at 471 (citing Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620 (2005)). 
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for the purpose of overriding the finality of judgments, and having 
reserved entirely to itself the discretion to do so, the state cannot argue 
that finality concerns weigh heavily against providing prisoners a 
meaningful opportunity to access those mechanisms.155 
He concluded that the criminal justice system continues to “grapple 
with the questions of which avenues of relief remain open to those advancing 
claims that they are wrongfully convicted.”156 He noted that “[i]n some 
states, . . . there are statutory mechanisms to set aside a conviction based on 
newly discovered evidence,” but it was “unclear whether there was a 
constitutional right to do so.”157 He reasoned, therefore, 
The remaining resort for the innocent convicted is to avail themselves 
of the opportunity to petition for clemency in whatever form the state 
has authorized. States may debate the value of expanding or contracting 
any of these avenues; in light of the tremendous probative power of 
DNA evidence, it may be wise to strike a different balance between 
accuracy and finality in cases where it is available.158 
Months later, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Osborne, 
compelling the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to overrule McKithen.159 
Since then, the courts have routinely rejected claims that access to evidence 
for DNA testing is required to, inter alia, support a petitioner’s clemency 
application. In so holding, the courts have entrenched an even stauncher 
fidelity to the legal process vision. The following cases demonstrate this. 
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had delayed its decision 
in the case of Cunningham v. District Attorney for Escambia County in order 
 
 155.  Id. at 484 (citations omitted). 
 156.  Id. at 495. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne, which was 
delivered after the district court considered McKithen. Id. In Osborne, the Supreme 
Court held that Osborne (who raised similar issues to McKithen) was not entitled to 
DNA evidence in postconviction proceedings as a matter of either substantive or 
procedural due process. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 
557 U.S. 52, 72–73 (2009). The Second Circuit essentially applied that decision in 
reversing the district court’s ruling that McKithen was entitled to conduct postconviction 
DNA testing as a matter of procedural due process. McKithen, 626 F.3d at 145, 150. The 
Second Circuit read Osborne as foreclosing a claim that a prisoner has a liberty interest 
in meaningful access to state clemency mechanisms. Id. at 151. 
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to consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne.160 Originally, 
Cunningham argued that he had a constitutional right to postconviction 
access to biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing.161 Without access 
and testing, Cunningham argued, he was unable to, inter alia, pursue an 
application for state clemency or pardon.162 However, post-Osborne, 
Cunningham filed supplementary material conceding that his clemency 
claim did not survive Osborne.163 The Eleventh Circuit readily agreed, 
“Because there is no constitutional right to state clemency proceedings, that 
cannot be a basis for an access to courts claim either.”164 
A federal district court was equally quick to dispose of a comparable 
claim in Alvarez v. McCollum.165 Alvarez sought to compel the release of 
evidence for DNA testing, arguing, inter alia, that the state was depriving 
him of his “right . . . to apply for executive clemency and the function that 
executive clemency serves in preventing the violation of constitutional rights 
that would arise from continued incarceration [of an actually innocent 
petitioner].”166 The court found that Osborne easily disposed of this claim: 
“The Osborne Court rejected the clemency-based claim before it, noting that 
it had previously ‘held that noncapital defendants do not have a liberty 
interest in traditional state executive clemency, to which no particular 
claimant is entitled as a matter of state law.’”167 The Supreme Court “squarely 
held that ‘Osborne therefore cannot challenge the constitutionality of any 
procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency.’”168 
Following this reasoning, Alvarez had failed to state a valid cause of 
action.169 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar claim in the 2011 case of Van 
Poyck v. McCollum.170 In that case, the court, applying Osborne, declined to 
 
 160.  Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney for Escambia Cty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 161.  Id. at 1254. 
 162.  Id. at 1254–55. 
 163.  Id. at 1255. 
 164.  Id. at 1272 (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 67–68). 
 165.  Alvarez v. McCollum, No. 6:08-cv-1024-Or1-28DAB, 2011 WL 130169, at *6 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2011). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. (quoting Osborne, 557 U.S. at 67–68). 
 168.  Id. (quoting Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 868–69 (11th Cir. 2011). 
  
2016] Postconviction DNA Testing & Clemency as a “Fail-Safe” 25 
 
find that Van Poyck had a “liberty interest, as a capital defendant, in 
pursuing DNA evidence testing . . . for the purpose of meaningful access to 
a full and fair clemency proceeding.”171 The court recognized that Osborne 
had left open “slim room” for the possibility that a capital defendant might 
have a liberty interest in state clemency that procedural due process might 
protect, but because Van Poyck had not couched his claim in terms that 
argued Florida’s procedures were inadequate, the court did not opine on the 
matter.172 
A federal district court in Ohio addressed the “slim room” left by 
Osborne in Hartman v. Walsh.173 Hartman claimed “that the state trial court 
denied him access to Ohio’s postconviction DNA testing process in violation 
of his procedural due process rights.”174 The court determined that 
Hartman’s claim did not fall into the “slim room” left by Osborne, rooting 
its decision—like Osborne and Skinner—in the principle of institutional 
settlement.175 Because Hartman had never pursued the relief that Ohio law 
provided him (i.e., specific state procedures for DNA testing), the court 
relied on Osborne’s institutional settlement lens to reject his claim, quoting: 
[Plaintiff’s] attempt to sidestep state process through a new federal 
lawsuit puts [plaintiff] in a very awkward position. If he simply seeks the 
DNA through the State’s discovery procedures, he might well get it. If 
he does not, it may be for a perfectly adequate reason, just as the federal 
statute and all state statutes impose conditions and limits on access to 
DNA evidence. It is difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when 
[plaintiff] has not invoked them. This is not to say that [plaintiff] must 
exhaust state-law remedies. But it is [plaintiff’s] burden to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the state-law procedures available to him in state 
post-conviction relief. These procedures are adequate on their face, and 
without trying them, [plaintiff] can hardly complain that they do not 
work in practice.176 
Again, Hartman had not challenged the nature of Ohio’s postconviction 
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DNA testing regime.177 Thus, he had no cause of action.178 
The Supreme Court’s fidelity to institutional settlement also dictated a 
federal district court’s decision in Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third 
Circuit Court.179 In that case the petitioner made a variety of due process 
claims, including that that he had been prevented from proving his actual 
innocence and furthering a clemency application by being denied access to 
DNA evidence.180 The court determined, however, that his clemency claim 
was barred by way of Heck v. Humphrey.181 In Heck, the Supreme Court 
determined 
that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for 
an alleged unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions 
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” 
unless the prisoner first shows that the conviction or sentence has been 
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or 
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus . . . .”182 
All that remained for Vaughn was the possibility of an attack on the 
fairness or application of the state’s DNA testing statute, which he had failed 
to make.183 The court found “that pleading failure cannot be cured because 
the Michigan statute reasonably balances the competing interests of the 
convicted person’s right to pursue DNA evidence and testing with the state’s 
right to maintain an orderly criminal justice system.”184 In other words, even 
without close examination, the state regime preserved the traditional notions 
of justice at the center of the majority’s concern in Osborne.185 
A number of petitioners have argued post-Osborne that a lack of access 
to DNA testing has the impact of making clemency proceedings violative of 
 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third Circuit Court, No. 14-CV-10458, 
2015 WL 404254, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2015). 
 180.  Id. at *1. 
 181.  Id. at *6. 
 182.  Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). 
 183.  Id. at *9. 
 184.  Id. (citing Franklin v. Cty. of Kalamazoo, No. 1:11-CV-36, 2011 WL 1042321, at 
*5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2011)). 
 185.  See id. 
  
2016] Postconviction DNA Testing & Clemency as a “Fail-Safe” 27 
 
due process,186 i.e., below the “minimal due process standard” set out in 
Woodard.187 This, petitioners argue, means they fall within Osborne’s “slim 
room” to challenge the constitutionality of access to evidence for DNA 
testing.188 The courts have largely rejected such challenges, and, in doing so, 
demonstrated a clear favoring of procedural regularity over substance. For 
example, in Wilson v. Kentucky, a petitioner challenged the constitutionality 
of Kentucky’s clemency procedures under the Due Process Clause when he 
had been denied access to DNA testing that could support his clemency 
application.189 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied his claim, reasoning 
that the law demanded no more than Wilson be provided access to the 
clemency process, and that the Governor file a statement of reasons for his 
decision.190 The clemency proceedings did not have to be meaningful in any 
other way.191 
Similarly, in Williams v. McCulloch, the petitioner sought a stay of 
execution pending testing of DNA evidence.192 Williams argued the state’s 
refusal to release the evidence violated his right to due process in clemency 
proceedings.193 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
disagreed, labeling the claim frivolous because Williams had two lawyers 
seeking clemency on his behalf, and Missouri’s clemency process did not 
guarantee discovery of evidence used at trial.194 Again, access was more 
important than substance.195 In a case that did not concern access to DNA, 
Tamayo v. Perry, the petitioner argued that Osborne had shifted the doctrine 
away from “minimal due process” (in context of clemency proceedings) and 
required clemency proceedings to have heightened due process 
protection.196 The petitioner’s basis for this argument was not clear, however 
the court rejected it outright, labeling Tamayo’s use of Osborne 
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“inapposite.”197 Osborne, the court pointed out, involved a due process 
challenge concerning DNA testing in the context of postconviction relief, 
which was different from an inmate challenging the executive’s clemency 
proceedings.198 Each of these cases demonstrate the courts’ fidelity to 
procedure over substance—an approach that has been documented in the 
context of clemency proceedings.199 
The courts have even remained loyal to the process vision when finding 
DNA testing is relevant to a clemency application. For example, in Gary v. 
Humphrey, Gary motioned for DNA testing after being denied clemency by 
the state parole board.200 The motion was granted for certain evidence (with 
the court concluding that such testing may be relevant to a state clemency 
application), and compensation for Gary’s counsel and for a DNA expert 
was approved.201 Based upon the DNA test results, Gary pursued a second 
state clemency hearing simultaneously with an extraordinary motion for new 
trial in state court.202 Gary’s counsel submitted vouchers for services related 
to the second clemency proceeding and new trial motion.203 The court 
approved compensation for services connected with the clemency 
proceeding but denied compensation for services related solely to the new 
trial.204 Gary appealed that decision to a federal district court, which denied 
his appeal.205 Although the district court’s decision does, by implication, 
agree that a clemency hearing (particularly one including potential 
exculpatory DNA evidence) is sufficiently important to warrant state-
funded counsel, it also continues the cautious, process-sensitive trend 
demonstrated by the other courts.206 This is because the court made a point 
in its judgment to narrow the decision under a specially labeled “Future 
Guidance” section.207 In that section, the court first stated it was not 
convinced that providing counsel to pursue DNA testing subsequent to the 
 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See Cooper & Gough, supra note 21, at 105; see also Cooper, Innocence 
Commissions, supra note 63, at 207–08.  
 200.  Gary v. Humphrey, No. 4:97-CV-181(CDL), 2011 WL 205772, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 
Jan. 21, 2011). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at *1, *7. 
 206.  See id. at *7. 
 207.  Id. at *7–8. 
  
2016] Postconviction DNA Testing & Clemency as a “Fail-Safe” 29 
 
final dismissal of a federal habeas petition, even if it is to be used in support 
of clemency relief, was mandatory under federal law.208 Second, it 
underscored that its decision to fund counsel did “not include a legal right to 
DNA testing to be used to support a clemency petition.”209 In other words, 
it was not at odds with the Osborne decision.210 Third, the court was careful 
to acknowledge the principle of institutional settlement.211 It affirmed the 
right to DNA testing was a “limited right under Georgia law.”212 And by 
underscoring that its decision did not undermine that regime: 
While the results [of the DNA testing] may also be used in a second 
clemency hearing, there is no statutory right to obtain those results for 
use in a clemency hearing, nor is there any statutory right to use them 
once they are obtained. The fact that they may be available for such 
future use in the clemency hearing is completely fortuitous.213 
These cases confirm that lower courts are taking a cautious approach 
to claims that access to DNA evidence for testing is constitutionally required 
to, inter alia, support a clemency application. This has largely been the case 
before and after Osborne. As a matter of routine, the courts have been quick 
to (1) deny the existence of a constitutional right to DNA testing;214 (2) 
restrict the “slim room” for due process challenges left open by Osborne;215 
and (3) further the doctrine that there is no substantive procedural right to 
state clemency proceedings.216 In so holding, the courts favor procedure over 
substance when it comes to the constitutionality of state clemency 
procedures (preserving Woodard’s finality-enforcing high threshold for 
relief), barely acknowledge the corrective justice function of clemency under 
Herrera, and remain loyal to the legal process vision, particularly by 
deferring to the principle of institutional settlement, and even underscoring 
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that any pro-access decisions do not usurp traditional notions of justice. This 
approach, however, is problematic. Part IV outlines the reasons why this is 
the case. 
IV. REASONS WHY THE CURRENT JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
APPROACH IS PROBLEMATIC 
The approach to the judicial decisionmaking identified in Part III is 
problematic. First, it undermines the corrective justice function of clemency 
and the value of substantive accuracy (as opposed to procedural accuracy) 
in the Era of Innocence.217 In addition, it demonstrates an awkward 
approach to credible scientific evidence that supports individualization (i.e., 
DNA) in light of courts’ more liberal approach to the less-scientifically 
supported individualization evidence provided by the soft sciences.218 
Finally, it largely ignores the institutional competence of the courts to 
respond to scientific progress and engender an approach to DNA access and 
testing that is sensitive to the legal process vision.219 
A. Current Judicial Decisionmaking Undermines the Corrective Justice 
Function of Clemency and the Value of Substantive Accuracy in the 
Era of Innocence 
The current approach to judicial decisionmaking undermines the 
corrective justice function of clemency. By labeling clemency the fail-safe of 
the criminal justice system in Herrera, the Supreme Court placed extreme 
confidence in the clemency function to remedy wrongful convictions, 
catapulting it into the role of a last chance saloon for innocents.220 Professor 
Austin Sarat now considers gubernatorial clemency to be “the court of last 
resort” as a result of the various procedural and substantive limits on federal 
habeas review.221 
The Supreme Court has “placed great weight and faith in the clemency 
process” to remedy innocence claims.222 It has “consistently affirmed the 
importance of the clemency process in ensuring the integrity of the criminal 
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justice system.”223 Moreover, numerous courts have rationalized their 
decisions not to grant “actual innocence” claims on the basis that a clemency 
process existed in the relevant jurisdictions.224 As a consequence of this 
Herrera-inspired doctrine, a right to a meaningful clemency process should 
be recognized, and part of this substance should be the opportunity to 
present exculpatory DNA evidence, if it exists.225 As one scholar comments, 
  In relying on the clemency process to fulfill an articulated and 
unique position in the criminal justice system, it is imperative that the 
Court uphold and maintain the integrity of the process. Therefore, the 
Court must ensure that prisoners have the tools necessary to present a 
meaningful petition to the clemency authority. Part of this meaningful 
ability to access the clemency process should be the ability to access 
state-held evidence for the purposes of modern DNA testing.226 
Moreover, such provision would encourage executives with 
decisionmaking powers to be both more accurate and more confident in 
making pro-clemency decisions.227 A shift towards tough-on-crime politics 
has effectively blinded the system to innocence claims by fueling antipathetic 
executive attitudes towards clemency and encouraging narrow 
interpretations of what can be done using the clemency power.228 At the state 
level, governors continue to find their use of clemency being used against 
them in election campaigns229 and tend to employ conservative clemency 
policies as a result.230 For example, although New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo had been an outspoken proponent of clemency prior to election, it 
took him over three years to grant his first, and to date only, pardon.231 
Notably, President Barack Obama boasts a similar conservative attitude 
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with regards to his use of the presidential pardon.232 This current state of 
affairs has led commentators to describe the current clemency system as in 
a “state of collapse.”233 Unfortunately, this collapse has not only coincided 
with clemency having to handle the responsibility of being the final remedy 
for innocence claims, but also comes at a time when the concept of innocence 
is solidifying its presence in the criminal justice system.234 These antipathetic 
attitudes are also embedded in the fabric of state clemency systems. For 
instance, numerous states underscore that a grant of clemency (especially 
one that is grounded on innocence) is a rarity or, at least, are unwelcoming 
of applications. For example, Georgia states that a grant of clemency based 
on “complete innocence” is “most rare,”235 and highlights that only two such 
pardons have been granted since 1943.236 In Virginia, it is emphasized that 
an “Absolute Pardon,” which is based on the belief that a petitioner was 
unjustly convicted and is innocent, is “rarely granted.”237 Point three of 
Wisconsin’s general information package about clemency reads: “Executive 
clemency is an extraordinary measure and is rarely granted.”238 The point is 
emboldened and double underlined by the state.239 
Thus, if a petitioner can access and test DNA evidence, and the results 
of such testing are exculpatory in some credible way, designing the 
constitutional framework to ensure that such evidence is presented to the 
executive is imperative.240 In other words, the constitutional framework 
should mandate state procedures that require, when available, that DNA 
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evidence be presented in clemency proceedings.241 The executive can then 
underpin his or her decision by way of this evidence, which is, at present, the 
most reliable individualization evidence science can offer.242 A decision to 
grant clemency in such circumstances is not “soft” on crime, but simply a 
decision rooted in what is scientifically most accurate.243 As the dissent in 
Osborne pointed out, DNA is “uniquely precise”244 and unrivaled in its 
ability to ascertain the “truth.”245 Decisions underpinned by scientific 
evidence would serve to strengthen the efficacy of the criminal justice 
system, not undermine it, as decisions that are likely more accurate are 
naturally more legitimate in the context of criminal process. Moreover, they 
would be the product of a rationalized procedure designed at the state level, 
thereby satisfying the principle of institutional settlement. As one scholar 
explained, “The Supreme Court has recognized that unless a state provides 
an additional remedy, clemency is the sole remedy for the constitutionally 
convicted yet innocent prisoner. Therefore, certain safeguards must exist to 
ensure that an actually innocent prisoner has the ability to properly 
communicate his innocence to the appropriate authority.”246 
This development is all the more necessary considering this is now 
widely considered to be the Era of Innocence. The American Innocence 
Movement began to emerge in the 1990s, after the power of DNA 
technology to exonerate the innocent was discovered.247 In 1992, Barry C. 
Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The Innocence Project to assist 
prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA testing.248 By the end 
of 1993, 135 people had been exonerated,249 including 14 whose innocence 
had been conclusively proven by postconviction DNA evidence. As of 
October 2015, 330 people had been exonerated by postconviction DNA 
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testing in America,250 and “innocence” has come to be a growing feature of 
legal, social, and political discourse.251 The Innocence Movement is now 
described as “the most dramatic development in the criminal justice world 
since the Warren Court’s Due Process Revolution of the 1960s.”252 
The effect of the Innocence Movement has been (or at least should be) 
to make the system more sensitive to substantive accuracy. The courts have 
acknowledged this in a very limited way, however. In fact, the majority in 
Osborne “omitted any mention of the importance of accuracy to due process 
jurisprudence.”253 It is therefore unsurprising that the lower courts have 
followed suit. However, “[f]ailing to mention accuracy as a core due process 
value was anomalous in a case seeking access to DNA testing, which, after 
all, has an ‘unparalleled ability’ to quickly and inexpensively get at the 
truth.”254 The courts must begin to remedy this anomaly and error. One way 
to do this is to sculpt a legal framework that provides for meaningful 
clemency proceedings, supported by DNA evidence where possible. 
B. Current Judicial Decisionmaking Demonstrates an Awkward Approach 
to Credible Scientific Individualization Evidence in Contrast to the Judicial 
Treatment of Individualization Evidence by the Soft Sciences 
The majority decision in Osborne has propelled a conservative 
approach to the provision of access to and testing of DNA evidence.255 The 
unrivaled accuracy of DNA to engage in individualization256 has created 
tension because it has disturbed the status quo.257 The Osborne majority 
believed there was a “dilemma [about] how to harness DNA’s power to 
prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system 
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of criminal justice.”258 The dissent, however, emphasized that the level of 
certainty provided by DNA warranted that tradition be side-lined, 
contending that finality concerns must give way when “objective proof that 
the convicted actually did not commit the offense later becomes available 
through the progress of science.”259 In his dissent, Justice Stevens conceded 
that to allow access and testing would harm finality, but such interests must 
take a backseat in light of the power of DNA evidence to prove innocence.260 
At the time Osborne was decided, the capabilities of DNA were 
making waves throughout the criminal justice system, not only with regard 
to access and testing of DNA evidence, but with regard to how it exposed 
the frailties of other forensic methods widely employed in the criminal 
justice system. In February 2009 (three months before the Osborne 
decision), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)—one of the world’s 
premier sources of independent, expert advice on scientific issues—
published a report (commissioned by Congress) on the past, present, and 
future use of forensic science in America (the NAS Report).261 The report 
was billed as a “blockbuster” that would overhaul the legal landscape 
relating to forensic evidence.262 
The report made some important observations and impacts. First and 
foremost, the report reached the unprecedented conclusion that DNA was 
the only forensic method that had “been rigorously shown to have the 
capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,” engage in 
individualization.263 Consequently, the report cast a new and officially 
stamped, critical light onto the soft sciences, such as fingerprint, tool-mark, 
bite-mark, and microscopic hair analysis.264 The bottom line was simple: “In 
a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic science professionals have 
yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their 
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conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this 
problem.”265 
However, generally, the NAS Report—and other catalogued criticism 
of forensic identification evidence—has had limited impact. In particular, it 
has failed to turn the heads of the judiciary when it comes to the admissibility 
of forensic identification evidence.266 Despite the NAS Report’s findings, 
trial judges continue to admit, often unreservedly, forensic identification 
evidence that engages with individualization.267 Moreover, appellate judges 
continue to defer to such trial court decisions or find the admission of such 
forensic identification evidence was a “harmless error” or lawful due to the 
fact defense counsel had the opportunity to challenge it (whether or not they 
did so effectively).268 Furthermore, the report’s findings and other such 
criticism has, on the whole, failed to persuade appellate judges that there has 
been a shift in scientific opinion or generation of controversy, within relevant 
forensic identification disciplines, which qualifies as “newly discovered 
evidence.”269 Interestingly, the judiciary’s approach across these claims is 
underpinned by its fidelity to the legal process vision.270 For example, 
concerns about unpicking trial verdicts and disturbing the adversarial model 
underscore review of admissibility decisions,271 and a strong desire to follow 
precedent and sign-off procedural regularity that underpin decisions 
concerning newly discovered evidence.272 
This general approach of the judiciary highlights an interesting 
paradox. On the one hand, the judiciary continues to favor individualization 
evidence from a variety of forensic disciplines—despite such practices being 
significantly criticized for lacking, at present, adequate scientific 
underpinning.273 On the other hand, as demonstrated by Parts II and III of 
this article, the judiciary are comfortable in taking a comparably 
conservative approach to questions concerning access to, and testing of, 
DNA evidence. 
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This is a sharp (and troubling) contrast because DNA is undoubtedly 
more scientifically qualified to engage in individualization than other 
forensic methods. DNA analysis has been “subject . . . to rigorous evaluation 
standards from the beginning, because scientific groundwork for DNA 
analysis had been laid outside the context of law enforcement.”274 Numerous 
institutions “funded and conducted extensive basic research, followed by 
applied research,” and “[s]erious studies on DNA analysis preceded the 
establishment and implementation of ‘individualization’ criteria and 
parameters for assessing the probative value of claims of 
individualization.”275 As the NAS explained, 
This history stands in sharp contrast to the history of research involving 
most other forensic science disciplines, which have not benefitted from 
extensive basic research, clinical applications, federal oversight, vast 
financial support from the private sector for applied research, and 
national standards for quality assurance and quality control. The goal is 
not to hold other disciplines to DNA’s high standards in all respects; 
after all, it is unlikely that most other current forensic methods will ever 
produce evidence as discriminating as DNA. However . . . the least that 
the courts should insist upon from any forensic discipline is certainty 
that practitioners in the field adhere to enforceable standards, ensuring 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.276 
This contrast is troublesome and should be acknowledged by the 
judiciary. At present, the judiciary is supporting the use of what we know to 
be less reliable individualization evidence277 and hampering the use of the 
most credible individualization evidence.278 Ironically, both approaches are 
underpinned by their fidelity to the legal process vision. 
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C. Current Judicial Decisionmaking Ignores the Institutional Competence of 
the Courts to Respond Appropriately to Scientific Progress and 
Engender an Approach to Access to DNA Testing that is Sensitive 
to the Legal Process Vision 
The courts have acknowledged the dilemma that DNA evidence 
presents for traditional notions of criminal justice.279 However, as 
demonstrated above, the courts have responded to claims concerning access 
to and testing of DNA evidence conservatively.280 The courts have not been 
eager to change tradition in the face of scientific development.281 One other 
reason underpinning this approach, which also reflects fidelity to the legal 
process vision, is that “most courts recognize the legislative process as the 
proper forum for creating such a right [to access DNA and perform 
testing].”282 In other words, the courts are of the view that the legislature has 
the institutional competence to, should they wish to, legally mandate 
postconviction DNA access and testing, and prescribe what frameworks, 
such as clemency proceedings, should facilitate its presentation 
postconviction.283 
This view is not altogether surprising. The legislature has long been the 
forum to respond to scientific progress in this context.284 However, this view 
also ignores numerous important factors. First, federal and state legislatures 
have been slow to respond in this domain. As one scholar puts it, “Congress 
and state legislatures have yet to fully heed the call to provide prisoners with 
a statutory mechanism to access evidence for DNA testing.”285 The courts 
thus need to remedy this inactivity. Second, this view is premised on the 
belief that judicial intervention would wrongly supersede the legislature.286 
“However, for the judiciary to recognize a right of postconviction access to 
DNA testing neither disturbs nor supersedes the ability of the legislature to 
determine a prisoner’s ability to utilize the judiciary to attack the validity of 
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a conviction.”287 The ability to pass judgment on the innocence or guilt of a 
properly convicted individual remains firmly independent from the 
judiciary.288 Therefore, “affording a prisoner a constitutional right to access 
and test old evidence does not ‘improperly short-circuit legislative 
activity.’”289 
Third, this view overlooks courts’, and in particular appellate courts’, 
institutional competence to respond to scientific developments.290 Although 
the courts suffer from a number of institutional deficiencies when it comes 
to engaging with science, namely their discomfort with fact-based 
assessments and non-binary questions, the shortcomings of the adversarial 
system, and judges’ lack of scientific expertise, these limitations can be 
overcome to a significant extent.291 Ultimately, it is courts’ constitutional role 
to review the law.292 Moreover, addressing change associated with scientific 
progress is a crucial part of the appellate judiciary’s day job.293 The courts, 
therefore, have the institutional power to develop and engage in appropriate 
decisionmaking procedures to suit the task at hand: they have the strength 
to evolve towards decisionmaking that is more sensitive to notions of 
accuracy. 
Moreover, the courts can do this and remain true to the legal process 
vision. As per the legal process vision, a “distinctive comparative advantage 
of the judiciary”294 is its ability to use “the defining tools of legal craft—to 
render decisions according to principle rather than discretion or subjective 
policy judgment.”295 The judiciary can, as part of their craft, strive for 
decisionmaking that accords with principles of accuracy.296 Moreover, the 
courts can do this and be loyal to notions of procedural regularity. This 
procedure not only defines the relative roles and duties of the different 
institutions, but also “provides mechanisms for systemic self-correction, an 
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important virtue under the relativist theory of democracy.”297 In other words, 
institutional procedure has a built-in corrective function.298 To bolster this 
strength, the courts can utilize a variety of preexisting institutional 
mechanisms. For example, judges can use procedures to narrow the disputed 
scientific issues; conduct hearings where the court can examine potential 
experts; and appoint independent experts, special masters, and specially 
trained law clerks.299 Courts also have a convening power, namely “the 
ability to bring together the various actors needed to craft effective solutions 
to multi-dimensional problems,”300 like, for example, scientific uncertainty. 
In the specific context of creating a postconviction right to DNA access 
and testing, and fashioning a due process doctrine that mandates meaningful 
clemency proceedings that can make use of exculpatory results, the courts 
can be proactive, and still entrench legal process thinking. First, the 
provision of a constitutional right to access alone does not disrupt finality.301 
Merely granting a request to access to evidence for DNA does not 
automatically result in a conviction being undermined.302 Testing can lead to 
results that indicate guilt as well as innocence.303 They can also be 
inconclusive; the decision in Skinner supports this notion.304 Second, the 
creation of a postconviction right to DNA access and testing, and the 
sculpting of meaningful clemency proceedings that make use of exculpatory 
results only serve to engender efficacy in the criminal justice system.305 In 
addition to the points made in Part IV.A, there is significant recognition 
“that the grip of finality should be relaxed in the face of the ability to 
establish innocence,”306 and states have demonstrated their acceptance of 
this in numerous ways. For example, they have provided statutory rights to 
postconviction DNA testing and created postconviction frameworks based 
around “actual innocence” and newly discovered evidence, which provide 
an opportunity for petitioners to seek to vacate their conviction based on 
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evidence that undermines their conviction.307 
In summary, the courts have institutional competence to address the 
scientific progress demonstrated by DNA evidence and harness it in a way 
that is sensitive to both substantive accuracy (as we see it in the Era of 
Innocence) and the legal process vision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
DNA technology has revolutionized the American criminal justice 
system.308 However, its unrivaled ability to engage in individualization, and 
thus disturb trial court findings has created great tension in the 
postconviction arena. This is because DNA technology challenges 
traditional notions of justice, which are underpinned by legal process theory 
and, in particular, the need for finality and reliance upon procedural 
regularity to generate legitimate outcomes. 
This article has explored the implications of judicial fidelity to the legal 
process vision when petitioners request access to DNA evidence and testing 
in order to, inter alia, support an application for clemency. At present, the 
lower courts routinely reject such claims, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Osborne to reject the existence of a postconviction right to DNA 
access and testing.309 In doing so, the courts demonstrate a largely 
unreserved loyalty to the legal process vision. 
This pattern in judicial decisionmaking is problematic for three key 
reasons. First, it significantly undermines the corrective justice function of 
clemency, as set out by the Supreme Court in Herrera.310 The courts are 
overlooking the fact that for clemency to be an effective fail-safe, it requires 
adequate constitutional protection. The courts should recognize a 
constitutional right to a meaningful clemency process, and part of this 
substance should encompass the opportunity to present exculpatory DNA 
evidence, if it exists. This vacuum in judicial decisionmaking, in turn, 
undermines the value of substantive accuracy in the Era of Innocence. The 
effect of the Innocence Movement, which has witnessed over 330 
postconviction DNA exonerations to date, has been (or at least should be) 
to make the system more sensitive to substantive accuracy. The courts have 
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largely failed to acknowledge this, however. With an ever-increasing tally of 
exonerations, this attitude must change. Second, the current judicial 
approach demonstrates an awkward approach to credible scientific evidence 
of individualization (i.e., DNA) in light of courts’ more liberal approach to 
the less-scientifically supported individualization evidence provided by the 
soft sciences.311 At present it appears that the judiciary is supporting the use 
of what we know to be less reliable individualization evidence provided by 
the soft sciences, and hampering the use of the most credible 
individualization evidence available, namely DNA. Third, the current 
approach ignores the institutional competence of the courts to respond to 
scientific progress and engender an approach to DNA access and testing 
(which can subsequently be used to support a meaningful clemency 
application) that is sensitive to the legal process vision.312 
In sum, the courts should take a more proactive approach to harnessing 
the power of DNA which, at present, provides a unique level of certainty. 
The courts must rethink their reliance on legal process theory to routinely 
reject the types of claims examined in this article. The courts must assist 
clemency to fulfill its corrective justice function by ensuring petitioners have 
the tools necessary to present meaningful clemency applications. These tools 
should include access to DNA evidence and testing. The lower courts must 
no longer, as a default position, apply Osborne, but instead recognize their 
own institutional competence to respond to the demands of the criminal 
justice system in the Era of Innocence and loosen the system’s grip on 
regular process and finality when cases of factual error can be proven by the 
application of credible scientific testing. Developing a legal framework that 
is more sensitive to substantive accuracy (as opposed to finality and 
procedural regularity), in appropriate cases, will only serve to improve the 
efficacy of the criminal justice system. The quest for factual accuracy 
supported by scientific developments should not dismantle the legal process 
vision, but simply ease it into the 21st Century, where it is known—for 
certain—that rational, pro-finality procedures can produce factually 
erroneous results. 
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